Speaker: Owen Griffiths, Department of Philosophy, University College London
Chair: Bruno Bentzen, School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University
Venue: Zoom meeting ID: 282 901 4273
Watch Live: https://b23.tv/9YZ8UR5
Abstract:
Ontological monists hold that all existents exist in exactly the same sense. Ontological pluralists hold that there are many different notions of existence, e.g. concrete objects like tables and chairs exist in a different way to abstract objects like numbers and sets. Correspondingly, the monist will want the familiar existential quantifier as a primitive logical constant, whereas the pluralist will want distinct ones, e.g. for abstract and concrete existence.
This dialogue examines how the debate between the monist and pluralist relates to standard tests for logicality. We first consider the best-known semantic test for logicality—isomorphism invariance—and then the best-known syntactic test—inferentialism. In both cases, we argue that the tests deliver judgements about logicality that favour the monist.